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One important difference between stage level predicates (SLPs) and individual level
predicates (ILPs) is their behavior with respect to locative modifiers. It is commonly
assumed that SLPs but not ILPs combine with locatives. The present study argues against
a semantic account for this behavior (as advanced by e.g. Kratzer 1995, Chierchia 1995) 
and proposes a genuinely pragmatic explanation of the observed stage level/individual
level contrast instead. The proposal is spelled out using Blutner’s (1998, 2000) optimal-
ity theoretic version of the Gricean maxims. Building on the observation that the
respective locatives are not event-related but frame-setting modifiers, the preference for
main predicates that express temporary properties is explained as a side-effect of “syn-
chronizing” the main predicate with the locative frame in the course of finding an optimal 
interpretation. By emphasizing the division of labor between grammar and pragmatics,
the proposed solution takes a considerable load off of semantics.
1 Locatives and the SLP/ILP Distinction
One of the most prominent linguistic criteria that have been advanced in order to 
distinguish stage level predicates (SLPs), which are commonly understood as
expressing temporary or accidental properties, and individual level predicates
(ILPs), which express (more or less) permanent or inherent properties, is their
behavior with respect to locative modifiers.
1 SLPs like tired, hungry or nervous
can be combined with locative modifiers (1a), while ILPs like blond, intelligent
or a linguist don’t seem to accept locatives (1b); see Chierchia (1995) and
Kratzer (1995) among many others.
(1) a. Maria was tired / hungry / nervous in the car. (SLP)
b. */??Maria was blond / intelligent / a linguist in the car. (ILP)
Adherents of the stage level/individual level distinction take data like these as
strong support for the claim that there is a fundamental difference between SLPs 
and ILPs in the ability to be located in space; see, e.g., the following quote from 
Fernald (2000):159
»It is clear that SLPs differ from ILPs in the ability to be located in space and time.«
Fernald (2000: 24)
The standard perspective under which these and similar contrasts concerning
perception reports, when-conditionals, subject effects, the distribution of the
Spanish copula forms ser and estar etc. have been considered is that the SLP/ILP
distinction essentially amounts to a grammatical manifestation of a deeper con-
ceptual difference.
2 To quote Fernald again:
»Many languages display grammatical effects due to the two kinds of predicates,
suggesting that this distinction is fundamental to the way humans think about the
universe.« Fernald (2000: 4)
In the past years, research interests have focussed almost exclusively on the
apparent grammatical effects of the SLP/ILP contrast. No comparable efforts
were made to uncover its conceptual foundation, although there is unanimity that 
a definition of SLPs and ILPs in terms of the dichotomy “temporary vs. perma-
nent” or “accidental vs. essential” cannot be but a rough approximation. This
could just be an accident, however, in which case we needn’t worry because
sooner or later someone would come up with an interesting story about the
conceptual side of the SLP/ILP contrast that fits with the observed grammatical
effects. But on the other hand, it might not be an accident at all but a hint that
something is wrong with the overall perspective on the stage level/individual
level distinction as a genuinely grammatical distinction that reflects an under-
lying conceptual opposition. The present study will explore the latter option.
More specifically, I will argue that the sentences in (1) show no grammatical
difference, nor do they reflect some fundamental conceptual split but rather
display a genuine pragmatic contrast.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief summary of
Kratzer’s (1995) and Chierchia’s (1995) semantic accounts, both providing
event-based explanations for the difference illustrated in (1). Section 3 presents
arguments against event-based analyses of copular sentences suggesting that the
difference at stake in (1) is not an issue of event semantics. Section 4 develops a
pragmatic explanation of what I will call the “temporariness effect” in (1). My
proposal will be laid out in the framework of bidirectional optimality theory
(Blutner 1998, 2000). Finally, section 5 offers a summary and some concluding
remarks.
3
2 Semantic Explanations
There are basically two semantic explanations that have been proposed to
account for the SLP/ILP contrast in (1).160
According to the influential proposal by Kratzer (1995), who synthesized the
stage level/individual level distinction with Davidsonian event semantics
4, SLPs
and ILPs differ in argument structure. SLPs have an extra event argument. This
is the reason why they combine with locative modifiers. That is, SLPs can be
located in space. ILPs lack such an extra event argument. Therefore, there is no 
entity whose location could be expressed by a locative modifier. This is
illustrated in (2)-(4). The lexical entries for a SLP like tired and an ILP like
blond are given in (2). While combining a SLP with a locative modifier would
yield a semantic representation like (3b), any attempt to add a locative to an ILP 
must necessarily fail; cf. (4b).
(2) a. tired: λx λe [TIRED (x, e)]
b. blond: λx [BLOND (x)]
(3) a. Maria was tired in the car.
b. ∃e [TIRED (maria, e) & LOC(e, IN (def-car))]
(4) a. */??Maria was blond in the car.
b. [BLOND (maria) & LOC(????, IN (def-car))]]
According to this view, SLPs and ILPs indeed differ in their ability to be located 
in space and this difference is traced back to the presence resp. absence of an
event argument.
Chierchia (1995) takes a somewhat different tack. He adopts the neo-David-
sonian view (e.g., Higginbotham 1985, 2000; Parsons 1990, 2000) according to
which all predicates introduce event arguments. Thus, SLPs and ILPs do not
differ in this respect. In order to account for the SLP/ILP contrast in combination 
with locatives, Chierchia then introduces a distinction between two kinds of
events: SLPs refer to location dependent events whereas ILPs refer to location
independent events; see also McNally (1998). The observed behavior wrt
locatives follows under the assumption that only location dependent events can
be located in space. In Chierchia’s own words:
»Intuitively, it is as if ILP were, so to speak, unlocated. If one is intelligent, one is
intelligent nowhere in particular. SLP, on the other hand, are located in space.«
Chierchia (1995: 178)
What is significant for our present purposes are not so much the differences
between Kratzer’s and Chierchia’s approach but their commonalities. Both
consider the SLP/ILP contrast in (1) as a grammatical effect. That is, sentences
like (1b) won’t receive a compositional semantic representation; they are
grammatically ill-formed. Kratzer and Chierchia furthermore share the general
intuition that SLPs (and they only) can be located in space. This is what the
difference in (1) is taken to show. And, finally, both analyses rely crucially on161
the idea that at least SLPs, possibly all predicates, introduce Davidsonian event
arguments. The next section will cast doubts on each of these assumptions.
3 Objections to Event-Based Explanations
I have two main objections to a semantic treatment of the SLP/ILP contrast in
combination with locatives along the lines of Kratzer (1995) or Chierchia
(1995). One concerns the analysis of the locatives in (1) as event-related modi-
fiers. The other relates to the neo-Davidsonian assumption that all predicates
introduce event arguments. Due to limitations of space I will sketch these
arguments only very briefly; but see Maienborn (2001, 2003a,b,d) for details and 
further justification.
3.1  Event-related vs. frame-setting locatives
First and most importantly, the locatives in (1) arguably do not belong to the
class of event-related VP-modifiers but are frame-setting modifiers according to 
the classification proposed in Maienborn (2001). 
Frame-setting modifiers tend to surface in sentence-initial position, but they are 
base-generated at a lower position within the functional shell of VP.
5 (Event-
related modifiers are base-generated VP-internally.) As for their semantics,
frame-setting modifiers do not add an additional predicate to the VP’s event
argument – this is what event-related modifiers do – but restrict the overall
proposition. What exactly is being restricted is a matter of semantic underspeci-
fication. Maienborn (2001) provides a series of independent syntactic, semantic, 
and prosodic criteria for determining the status of a modifier as event-related or 
frame-setting; see also Frey (2003).
Let us have a look at the possible interpretations of the frame-setting locative in 
(5). Notice first, that I am only interested in the analysis of (5) as a copular
sentence. We may neglect the fact that (5) can also be analyzed as a passive
sentence. (In the latter case the locative would be event-related, expressing that
an event of marrying which Maradona was subject to took place in Italy.)
(5) Maradona was married in Italy. 
There are several ways in which we could make sense of the idea that the
locative frame in Italy restricts the claim that Maradona was married. A speaker
may use the locative frame to restrict the time for which he makes his claim; see 
Klein’s (1994) notion of topic time. This gives us a temporal reading of the
locative frame as illustrated by the paraphrase in (5’a). The locative may also be 
used to restrict the juridical background for the main predicate as indicated by
(5’b). And, given the appropriate contextual support, a locative frame may
always be interpreted epistemically as in (5’c). That is, sentence (5) could refer,
e.g., to a situation where the yellow press in Italy propagates that Maradona was 162
married (while people in his home country Argentina knew that he wasn’t). And 
there might be further ways of interpreting the semantically underspecified
locative frame.
(5’) a. When he was in Italy, Maradona was married. temporal reading
b. According to the laws in Italy, Maradona was married.
c. According to the belief of the people in Italy, Maradona was married.
epistemic reading
d. etc.
Thus, due to their semantic underspecification, frame-setting modifiers always
give rise to several potential utterance meanings. Now we can make more precise 
what is going on in sentences like (1). The SLP/ILP contrast that we want to
explain apparently concerns the availability of the temporal reading of a frame-
setting locative. Take, e.g., (6). Unlike the corresponding temporal reading of
(6a), which is perfectly fine, under normal circumstances sentence (6b) has no
interpretation saying that when she was at the disco, Maria was a smart linguist.
Yet, this does not mean that (6b) is ungrammatical. The locative frame might
well receive, e.g., an epistemic reading. Sentence (7) provides a natural context
for such a reading.
(6) a. At the disco, Maria was drunk
b. ??At the disco, Maria was a smart linguist. temporal reading
(7) At the disco, Maria was a really smart linguist who was, unfortunately, a 
terrible dancer. At the institute, though, she was a terrible linguist who
was, at least, a great dancer. epistemic reading
A locative frame like in the car in (1) is not particularly well suited for an epis-
temic interpretation because it cannot serve to single out a group of people who 
could be assigned a certain stable belief. But with sufficient contextual support
an epistemic reading may be construed even here. Assume, e.g., that Peter, while 
driving home with his father, describes his new girlfriend Maria as having blond 
hair. Later in the evening Peter claims that she is a brunette. This context would 
favour an epistemic reading for (1’b). Notice that the SLP-variant (1’a) can be
given an epistemic interpretation, too. Let only the context be Peter giving two
different explanations why Maria behaved so strangely at the party. (Hence,
frame-setting locatives do not support any logically valid inference as to the
location of the subject referent. The locative in the car does not locate Maria but 
the source of belief in (1’).)
(1’) a. In the car, Maria was tired. epistemic reading
b. In the car, Maria was blond. epistemic reading
In sum, the difference at stake in (1) and (6) is not an issue of grammaticality but
concerns the acceptability of these sentences under a temporal reading of the163
locative frame. It is only under this reading that we observe a preference for
temporary predicates. I will refer to this preference as temporariness effect.
3.2 Neo-Davidsonian approaches to copular sentences
In recent years it has become popular to assume that every predicate, no matter
whether SLP or ILP, introduces a Davidsonian event argument; see in particular 
Higginbotham (1985, 2000), Parsons (1990, 2000) and subsequent work. I have
argued in Maienborn (2003a-d) that this is inadequate for copular sentences (and 
true stative verbs). My results concerning German sein as well as Spanish ser/es-
tar show that copular SLPs and ILPs pattern alike in failing all standard tests for 
Davidsonian events.
Davidsonian events are generally considered to be spatiotemporal entities with 
functionally integrated participants. Common linguistic diagnostics for the
presence of underlying event arguments are the combination with locative modi-
fiers, perception reports, the combination with manner adverbials etc.; see Mai-
enborn (2003a-d) for further tests. If these diagnostics are applied carefully to
copular sentences, SLPs and ILPs show no properties of event expressions at all.
As seen above, the locatives in sentences like (1) are not event-related but
frame-setting. So they do not provide a reliable event diagnostic. Checking for
unmistakably event-related modifiers reveals that even SLPs do not tolerate
them. This is illustrated in (8) with data from German. (The temporal adverbials
make sure that the locative is a VP-modifier and therefore event-related.)
(8) Combination with event-related locatives:
a. *Das Kleid ist auf der Wäscheleine nass. (SLP)
The dress is  on  the  clothesline wet.
b. *Paul war (zu dieser Zeit) unter  der Straßenlaterne betrunken.
Paul was (at  this    time) under the street lamp      drunk.
c. *Der  Sekt  ist (immer noch) im Wohnzimmer warm.
The champagne is  (still) in.the living room warm.
d. *Maria ist (gerade)             im     Auto müde.
Maria is  (at the moment) in.the car   tired.
e. *Maria war (die ganze Zeit) vor dem Spiegel blond/eitel/intelligent (ILP)
Maria was (the whole time) in-front-of the mirror blond/vain/intelligent.
If at least copular SLPs introduced an event argument, we would expect a loca-
tive modifier expressing the location of this event to be possible. That is, a sen-
tence like (8a) should be able to indicate that there is a state of the dress being
wet and that this state is located on the clothesline. Yet there is no such interpre-
tation for (8a). Even more, (8a) as well as (8b-e) are clearly ungrammatical. That 
is, contrary to common wisdom (see above) SLPs and ILPs do not differ in their 
ability to be located in space; they both resist spatial location.
The other diagnostics show the same result. This is illustrated in (9) and (10).
Copula constructions do not show up as infinitival complements of perception164
verbs. (This has already been observed by Carlson 1977). And they do not com-
bine with manner adverbials, comitatives and the like; see Maienborn (2003d)
for a discussion of apparent counter-examples.
(9) Infinitival complements of perception verbs:
a. *Ich sah Maria müde sein.
I     saw Maria tired be.
b. *Ich hörte die Callas heiser sein.
I     heard the Callas coarse be.
(10) Combination with manner adverbials and the like:
a. *Maria war unruhig durstig.
Maria was restlessly thirsty.
b. *Paul war friedlich / mit seinem Teddy / ohne    Schnuller müde.
Paul was calmly   / with his       teddy / without dummy   tired.
This is not the place to discuss these issues with the necessary scrutiny. I just
want to stress that if we take the Davidsonian approach seriously then there are
good reasons to conclude that copular sentences do not introduce an event argu-
ment, no matter whether they express a temporary or a permanent property.
This means that an explanation of the temporariness effect in (1) cannot rely on 
events.
4 Pragmatic Explanation for the Temporariness Effect
In the following I want to propose a purely pragmatic explanation of the
observed temporariness effect based on Blutner’s (1998, 2000) optimality
theoretic version of the Gricean maxims. The basic idea is that the preference for 
temporary properties results from an optimal interpretation of a semantically
underspecified sentence.
Let us take a sentence like (11) as an illustration and we may concentrate on
the temporal reading of the locative frame because, as shown in section 3.1, it is 
only here that the temporariness effect shows up.
(11) In Italy, Maria was rich.
Under the temporal reading, the locative modifier serves to restrict the topic time 
of the sentence; see Klein (1994). Hence, the grammatically determined meaning 
can be rendered as: there is a topic time t*, when Maria was in Italy, and Maria 
is rich at t*; see Maienborn (2003a: chap. 5) for a compositional DRT-account.
The grammatically determined meaning is underspecified in several respects.
The grammar leaves open whether:165
(i) Maria was also rich before and/or after t*,
(ii) being rich is a temporary or permanent property of Maria,
(iii) being located in Italy is a temporary or permanent property of Maria.
That is, there are several potential specifications for sentence (11) given a tem-
poral reading of the locative frame. These interpretations are presented schema-
tically in (12). (Bold brackets indicate the topic time, t*; “$$” refers to the time
of the main predicate, t
P; and the dotted line represents Maria’s life time, t
L.)
(12) Candidates for the temporal reading of (11):
a. Int1: [$$$$$$$] t* = t
P, t
P ⊂ t
L
b. Int2: $$$[$$$$$$]$$$$ t* ⊂ t
P, t
P ⊂ t
L
c. Int3: $$$$$$$$$$[$$$$$$$$$]$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ t* ⊂ t
P, t
P = t
L
d. Int4: [$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$] t* = t
P, t
P = t
L
Interpretation Int1 refers to the case in which Maria stayed in Italy for a delimit-
ed time and she was rich at exactly that time. Int2 covers all those cases where
Maria is rich also before and/or after her stay in Italy. According to Int3, Maria 
stayed in Italy only for some delimited time but she was rich during her whole
life; and Int4 refers to Maria staying in Italy and being rich all her life.
Whereas the grammar remains neutral wrt Int1 – Int4, pragmatic strengthening
will yield  Int1 as optimal interpretation for sentence (11) (under a temporal
reading of the locative frame). This kind of interpretive optimization can be
formulated within Blutner’s (1998, 2000) framework of a bidirectional optimali-
ty theory which aims at formalizing conversational implicatures on the basis of
two competing economy principles (Zipf 1949; Atlas & Levinson 1981; Horn
1984; Levinson 2000). The Q-principle is hearer-oriented. It requires you to tell 
the hearer as much as you can. The I-principle (in Horn’s terminology: R-
principle) is speaker-oriented. It invites the speaker to produce the minimal
output that suffices to achieve his communicative goals. Both tendencies to
minimize efforts are to be balanced in order to produce an optimal pairing of
form and meaning; see the formulation of Horn (1984: 13) in (13); Blutner’s OT-
reconstruction is given in (14); see also Jäger (2000: 48). (“α < β” is to be read:
The form-meaning pair α is less costly/more harmonic than the pair β wrt a set
of (possibly weighted) constraints.)
(13) a. Q-principle (hearer-oriented): Say as much as you can (given I).
b. I-principle (speaker-oriented): Say no more than you must (given Q).
(14) Bidirectional OT:
A form-meaning pair 〈F, Int〉 is optimal
6 iff:
Q: there is no other optimal pair 〈F’, Int〉 such that: 〈F’, Int〉 < 〈F, Int〉
I: there is no other optimal pair 〈F, Int’〉 such that: 〈F, Int’〉 < 〈F, Int〉.166
The basic idea is that pragmatic strengthening involves blocking of interpreta-
tions as well as preferring certain interpretations. The Q-principle compares
different forms with the same meaning and blocks those form-meaning pairs for
which there exist better alternative forms. The I-principle compares form-mean-
ing pairs which all have the same form but differ in meaning and it prefers those 
pairs with the most simple/straightforward interpretation. An optimal pair must
fulfil both principles.
Let us see which of our form-meaning pairs for sentence (11) are optimal in the 
sense of the definition given in (14).
(15) Form-meaning pairs for (11):
a. 〈F, Int1〉 c. 〈F, Int3〉 with F = (11)
b. 〈F, Int2〉 d. 〈F, Int4〉
Take first the pairing in (15d). The locative frame refers to a permanent property 
of Maria here. Hence, it does not narrow down the topic time. There are alter-
native forms for expressing this meaning, see (16).
(16) a. Maria was always rich.
b. During her whole life, Maria was rich.
The advantage of the forms in (16) is that they have no other interpretations
apart from Int4. Therefore, they will be preferred by a Constraint like “Avoid
Ambiguity” in (17), which states that, given identical interpretations, form-
meaning pairs with less ambiguous forms are to be preferred. This leads to the
preference in (18). (For the sake of simplicity (16a,b) are considered together.)
(17) Constraint: Avoid Ambiguity!
〈F’, Int〉 < 〈F, Int〉 iff F’ is less ambiguous than F.
(18) 〈F’, Int4〉 < 〈F, Int4〉 with F’ = (16)
To keep things simple, let us assume that the pairing 〈F’, Int4〉 is indeed optimal.
Our pair in (15d) is ruled out as non-optimal then, because it violates the Q-
principle. That is, we can draw the Q-based implicature that being located in
Italy must be a temporary property of Maria (t* ⊂ t
L). The temporal
interpretation of frame-setting modifiers is pragmatically licensed only if the
topic time is properly restricted by the modifier. 
Let us assume that the three remaining pairs (15a-c) fulfill the Q-principle.
That is, there are no better alternative expressions for the interpretations Int1-3.
If they are compared with each other, (15a) will be preferred by the constraint
“Be strong” in (19) because Int1 is implied by Int2 and Int3; i.e., Int1 is the most 
restrictive interpretation. The respective preferences are given in (20).167
(19) Constraint Be strong! (cf. Blutner 2000)
〈F, Int’〉 < 〈F, Int〉 iff Int’ is more restrictive than Int.
(20) a. 〈F, Int1〉 < 〈F, Int2〉
b. 〈F, Int1〉 < 〈F, Int3〉
Hence, the pairings in (15b) and (15c) are non-optimal because they violate the
I-Principle. The  most simple way of interpreting the underspecified temporal
relation between the topic time and the predication time is equating them
(t* = t
P). This is an I-based implicature: The looser meaning that Maria was rich 
during her stay in Italy is pragmatically strengthened to the claim that she was
rich at exactly that time.
7
Thus, we end up with (15a) as an optimal form-meaning pair. Only the pair
〈F, Int1〉 fulfills both the Q-principle and the I-principle. The relevant steps in
deriving the temporariness effect are summarized in (21): Starting with the topic 
time being improperly included in Maria’s life time as well as in the time of
Maria being rich (21a), the Q-based implicature leads to a proper inclusion of
the topic time in Maria’s life time (21b); and the I-based implicature equates
topic time and predication time (21c).
(21) Temporariness effect:
a. Semantic underspecification: t* ⊆ t
L & t* ⊆ t
P
b. Q-based implicature: t* ⊂ t
L
c. I-based implicature: t* = t
P
Notice that the temporariness effect on the main predicate emerges rather in-
directly, mediated by the temporarity of the frame-setting modifier. If a locative
frame is pragmatically required to hold temporarily, and if, for independent
reasons the temporal extension of the main predicate must be coextensive with
the topic time, it follows that the main predicate is also interpreted as expressing 
a temporary property. What we find is a synchronization of two properties.
Basically, it is the locative frame that is required to hold temporarily and as a
kind of side effect this carries over to the main predicate.
The acceptability differences in (1) reflect the plausibility of such a syn-
chronization in view of context and world knowledge about possible or typical
temporal extensions of properties. Our world knowledge tells us that the average 
time of staying in a car and of being tired fit together quite easily, whereas being 
blond normally lasts for a longer period – unless the context provides some
magic shampoo that turns people blond just for an hour or so. In this case the
sentence would be fine. If we change our locative frame as in (22) acceptability
judgements are reversed.
(22) a. ?In Italy, Maria was tired. temporal reading
b. In Italy, Maria was blond. temporal reading168
While it is quite easy to derive the temporal reading for (22b), i.e., to syn-
chronize Maria’s staying in Italy and her being blond, we would need some
additional support from the context in order to accept an analogous reading for
the SLP-variant (22b). We could either assume that Maria stayed in Italy only for 
a very short time, so that it could be possible for her to be tired throughout that
time. Or we could infer that she was repeatedly tired during her stay in Italy.
This is just to illustrate that the relevant judgements do not simply rely on the
distinction of temporary vs. permanent properties but take into account our rich
conceptual knowledge about possible or typical temporal extensions of proper-
ties and how they can be adjusted.
5 Conclusion
To sum up, I have proposed a pragmatic explanation of the temporariness effect 
displayed in (1) that is based on very general pragmatic economy principles plus 
world knowledge concerning the possible or typical temporal extension of
properties. No specific assumptions were needed in order to account for the
apparent SLP/ILP contrast in combination with locatives.
On the contrary, compared to the semantic approaches of Kratzer (1995) and
Chierchia (1995), the pragmatic account advocated here is more parsimonious
wrt the lexicon, the grammar and ontology.
First, there is no need for postulating a “fundamental cognitive division of the
world” (corresponding roughly to temporary vs. permanent properties) that is
reflected in the lexicon by some type of marking SLPs and ILPs.
Secondly, contrary to first appearances the grammar is not sensitive to the
temporariness effect either. In particular, predicates do not behave differently
wrt locative modifiers.
And thirdly, there is also no need to stipulate ontological distinctions like
Chierchia’s location dependent vs. location independent events. Within the
proposal developed here the locative frame is not used to locate a property in
space but to single out the topic time. The only link between the locative and the 
main predicate is their temporal location. If this account of the temporariness
effect is on the right track, this is a quite straightforward application of bidirec-
tional OT which nevertheless takes a considerable load off of the grammar and
leads to a more balanced division of labour between grammar and pragmatics.
Notes
1 The SLP/ILP distinction goes back to Milsark (1974, 1977) and Carlson (1977).
2 See Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997), Fernald (2000), Jäger (2001), Maienborn (2003a: chap. 
2.3) for commented  overviews of  SLP/ILP diagnostics that have been discussed in the literature.169
3 This study is exclusively concerned with the SLP/ILP contrast showing up in combination with
locative modifiers. See Maienborn (2003c) for a discourse-based account of the distribution of
Spanish ser/estar.
4 Throughout this paper, I use the term “event” as a cover term for events proper, processes and
(certain) states; cf. Bach’s (1986) notion “eventuality”. Other labels that can be found in the
literature for an additional Davidsonian event argument include “spatiotemporal location” (e.g.
Kratzer 1995) and “Davidsonian argument” (e.g. Chierchia 1995). See Maienborn (2003a,b,d) for
qualifications concerning the borderline category of states.
5 Due to limitations of space I will ignore the information structural impact of fronting frame-
setting modifiers and analyze them on a par with their post-verbal variants.
6 In Blutner’s terminology “super-optimal”.
7 This is a temporal variant of “conditional perfection”, i.e., the pragmatic strengthening of a
conditional statement into a biconditional; see Geis & Zwicky 1971, van der Auwera (1997).
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